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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a case study on applying two model checkers,
Spin and Divine, to verify key properties of a C++ software frame-
work, known as ADAPRO, originally developed at CERN. Spinwas
used for verifying properties on the design level. Divine was used
for verifying simple test applications that interacted with the im-
plementation. Both model checkers were found to have their own
respective sets of pros and cons, but the overall experience was pos-
itive. Because both model checkers were used in a complementary
manner, they provided valuable new insights into the framework,
which would arguably have been hard to gain by traditional testing
and analysis tools only. Translating the C++ source code into the
modeling language of the Spin model checker helped to find flaws
in the original design. With Divine, defects were found in parts of
the code base that had already been subject to hundreds of hours
of unit tests, integration tests, and acceptance tests. Most impor-
tantly, model checking was found to be easy to integrate into the
workflow of the software project and bring added value, not only
as verification, but also validation methodology. Therefore, using
model checking for developing library-level code seems realistic
and worth the effort.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Software and its engineering→ Formal software verifica-
tion.
KEYWORDS
model checking concurrent C++, verification concurrent C++,model
checking C++ case study
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1 INTRODUCTION
ADAPRO stands for ALICE Data Point Processing Framework. It is
an open source C++ 14 software framework1 , consisting of about
6000 lines of source code2. It is meant for building configurable,
remote-controllable,multi-threaded daemon applications. ADAPRO
was originally conceived as a collection of common routines used
for implementing theALICE Data Point Service (ADAPOS)[22] soft-
ware architecture (as part of the ALICE RUN3 upgrade[9]). ALICE
stands for A Large Ion Collider Experiment. ALICE is one of the
four major experiments at the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) of the
European Organisation for Nuclear Research (CERN).
The highly concurrent nature of ADAPRO makes its verifica-
tion challenging by conventional means. Although the framework
and its applications[22] have been subject to hundreds of hours of
unit tests, integration tests, and acceptance tests, ADAPRO is too
complex for its all behaviours to be anticipated by tests. Therefore,
it is also hard to say how adequate these tests actually were in cov-
ering the software’s concurrent behavior. Even though ADAPRO
has its roots in a specific use case, it has evolved into a reusable
tool. Some ADAPRO applications may be expected to be able to
run autonomously for months without human intervention.
All of these facts reinforce the importance of a formal verifi-
cation project, because even rarely occurring defects may cause
costly damage, as noted by Gerard J. Holzmann, the author of the
Spinmodel checker [15]. A study by John Fitzgerald et al. confirms
the impact of formal verification on software quality [10].
To address this challenge we set up a project to explore the fea-
sibility of applying model checking[2, 19, 25] to thoroughly verify
ADAPRO’s critical properties. We chose model checking, because
it naturally fits with the Finite State Machine (FSM) paradigm used
by the framework, which will be discussed later. Furthermore, we
decided to use model checking on two levels of abstraction. This
decision proved to be a good idea, since using two different model
checkers in a complementarymanner helped to find different kinds
of issues faster.
On the higher level of abstraction, we wanted to verify that the
very design of ADAPRO itself is correct, so we constructed a new
model for it. After experimenting with the NuSMV [7], TLA+[21],
and Spin[14] model checkers, we decided to choose Spin for this
purpose. For verifying ADAPRO’s actual implementation, we per-
formed software model checking. The model checker Divine[3]
was chosen for this purpose.
Contribution. Formal verification turned out to reveal important
issues not previously found by testing, even though it wasn’t possi-
ble to obtain exhaustive results. Our findings necessitated changes
1available online at https://gitlab.com/jllang/adapro
2as measured in 25 March 2019, using David A. Wheeler’s Sloccount utility, available
online at https://dwheeler.com/sloccount/
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in the design and implementation of ADAPRO. The changes will
be part of the foundation of the next major version of ADAPRO
(v5.0.03). In this paper we will share our experience, discoveries,
and lessons gained from our verification project.
Paper structure. We first give a brief overview on related work in
Section 2. Section 3 offers an overview of the ADAPRO framework.
Section 4 gives the necessary definitions, assumptions and proper-
ties for design-level verification. In Section 5, we discuss our find-
ings on this part of the project. Section 6 describes the effort for ver-
ifying the C++ implementation and its results. In Section 7, we dis-
cuss our experiences and lessons learned from using the twomodel
checkers. We end the article with conclusion, future prospects, and
acknowledgements.
2 RELATED WORK
There are many case studies on using model checking to verify the
correctness of production software; too many to list here compre-
hensively. Some examples include [1, 5, 6, 8, 12, 17, 18, 26]. Fitzger-
ald et al. have written a survey on many industrial use cases [10].
ADAPRO is similar to the SMI++[11] system in its reliance on an
FSM model. However, ADAPRO is more restricted, since it doesn’t
have a Domain Specific Language (DSL) and its FSM model is rigid
in the sense that the user can’t define new states or commands. In-
stead of synthesizing distributed control systems, ADAPRO is fo-
cused on assembling threads into a remote controllable concurrent
application. ADAPRO applications can interact with SMI++ based
systems using the Distributed Information Management (DIM)[13]
protocol as its communications layer, which has been demonstrated
by the ADAPOS Manager application.
All LHC experiments use the SMI++ system for their control
systems. Formal verification has been performed on the Compact
Muon Solenoid (CMS) control system [18], which demonstrates the
feasibility of building and analysing control systems with tens of
thousands of nodes, based on hierarchies of FSMs. ADAPRO also
follows a similar approach, though it features a simple tree with
just root and a number of leafs.
Compared to most of the papers mentioned in this section, our
approach was more lightweight in that we didn’t use automated
model extraction or translation tools. Similarly to [26] and [6], we
wanted to explore the correct level of abstraction for finding the
most relevant aspects of the algorithms used in ADAPRO, by build-
ing the design-level model by hand. Due to the complexity ofADAPRO,
full formal software model checking was not computationally fea-
sible. Instead, we used Divine as a high coverage bug hunting tool.
Our lightweight approach seemed to suit the needs of this project
well, and we believe it to be realistically reproducible in other sim-
ilar projects.
3 ADAPRO
The basic actor in ADAPRO is the abstract Thread class, which fol-
lows an FSM approach. The domain logic of an application is meant
to be implemented as virtual methods and/or callbacks, called user-
defined code, provided to the framework through specialized Thread
3we discuss the version available at https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3258225
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Figure 1: Thread state transition diagram
instances. The role of the framework is to manage Threads. Figure
1 shows the state transition diagram of the Thread FSM.
A Thread moves from one state to another upon commands as
depicted in Figure 1. Should the Thread ever encounter an unde-
fined state/command combination, it is specified to take no action
(other than printing a warning message) in such situation. To pre-
vent this from happening, the FSM is not directly exposed to the
user. Instead, an object-oriented approachwith safe accessor meth-
ods is used. The methods for changing the command of a Thread
are called trigger methods, and they have synchronous (i.e. block-
ing) and asynchronous (non-blocking) variants. More information
on theApplication Programmable Interface (API) is available on Git-
Lab4.
During a state transition, the Thread5 invokes a transition call-
back, a user-defined function that takes the target state as its argu-
ment. The transition callback is not allowed to throw exceptions or
interfere with the framework in any other way. If the Thread enters
the state STARTING or STOPPING, it invokes a corresponding virtual
method, implemented by the user. The Thread keeps invoking an-
other virtual method in a loop for as long as it stays in the state
RUNNING. The three virtual methods associated with these states
(prepare, finish, and execute respectively) are allowed to fail
by throwing exceptions. If the Thread base class catches an excep-
tion thrown by the inheriting class, it moves to the state ABORTING,
prints an error message, moves to the state ABORTED, and halts.
The states whose names end with “ING” in Figure 1 are the ones,
during which the backend thread is performing computation. A
Thread that is in one of the states READY, STOPPED, or ABORTEDmust
neither posess any dynamically allocated objects or resources, nor
hold any locks, so that it can be safely deleted. A Thread in state
PAUSED is considered to be temporarily suspended and capable of
4see https://gitlab.com/jllang/adapro/-/jobs/artifacts/5.0.0/download?job=manual for
the manual and https://jllang.gitlab.io/adapro/ for the API documentation
5throughout this article, we use capital initial letter ‘T’ to distinguish the ADAPRO
class Thread from the general concept of a thread
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start_async()
prepare()
execute()
STARTING
RUNNING
loop
[command = CONTINUE]
:Thread
trans_cb:
trans_cb, prepare,
and execute are
defined by user.
Figure 2: Asynchronous Thread startup
moving back to the state RUNNING or proceeding to the STOPPING state
on short notice.
Thread uses the C++ standard library thread class as its back-
end. Some advanced functionality also involves the PThreads and
Linux APIs through native handles. POSIX or Linux specific parts
of the framework are not critical and they’re guarded with macros
to ensure portability. These parts were left outside of the scope of
this verification project.
The interpretation of the states and transitions is up to the im-
plementing class, since Thread doesn’t define (i.e. it only declares)
the virtual methods or the transition callback. The intended use
case of the Thread class is running a repetitive task in background,
in the way how services or daemons work in process level. For a
batch job, a standard library thread is probably more appropriate
choice. Figure 2 is a UML sequence diagram showing the asynchro-
nous startup sequence of a Thread as an example on the interac-
tions between the owner of a Thread, the backend of the Thread,
and the transition callback.
3.1 Session and Supervisor
An ADAPRO application consists of a special Thread known as the
Supervisor and one or more other Threads, known as workers. The
user mustn’t manage Supervisor directly, but instead utilize the
static methods of a class called Session, which follows the singleton
design pattern and runs on the main thread. Session is responsi-
ble for framework startup and shutdown sequences. For technical
reasons, the lifetime of a Session consists of separate initialization
and runtime phases.
During the initialization phase, Session registers signal handlers
first. Then it constructs the configuration using default values, file,
and/or command-line arguments, initializes a logger. After that,
Session possibly performs certain interactions with the operating
system. At the end of the initialization phase, Session constructs
a Supervisor, handing over references to the logger, configuration,
Supervisor(logger, cfg, factories)
:Supervisor
INITIALIZE(ctx)
:Session Registering signal
handlers, fetching
configuration, and
building a logger
A list of factories
for constructing
and handing over the
ownership of workers
factories:
f(logger,cfg)
loop
[f in factories]
worker
 startup() 
Figure 3: Session initialization
and user-defined worker factories. Supervisor then takes care of
constructing the workers by applying the factories to the logger
and configuration. Figure 3 gives a simplified overview on Session
initialization.
The state of Supervisor represents the overall state of the appli-
cation in the sense that Supervisor is the first Thread to start and
the last Thread to stop.When a signal or command arrives from an
external process, Supervisor propagates the appropriate FSM com-
mand to the workers. Figure 4 presents propagation of the START
command as an example. The sequences for propagating PAUSE,
RESUME, and STOP commands are similar.
The runtime phase of Session starts with Session sending the
START command to Supervisor. After that, Session remains passive
until the Supervisor halts or a signal handler or the global excep-
tion handler is activated. When the runtime phase ends, Session
returns a one-byte status code, which is a bitmask of eight differ-
ent flags representing certain common error categories.
Supervisor starts workers asynchronously, after which it blocks
until all workers have ended their startup sequences. When the
startup sequence ends, Supervisor and all workers havemoved into
one of the six states below STARTING shown in Figure 1. In addition
to propagating an external STOP command, Supervisor also propa-
gates it if one or more workers have aborted or if all of the workers
have stopped.
4 DESIGN-LEVEL VERIFICATION
We first wanted to verify that the design of ADAPRO is correct. To
this end, a set of key correctness properties called the Theory of
ADAPRO was identified and formalized in Linear Temporal Logic
(LTL)[23], presented in Section 4.2 below. Section 4.4 discusses the
construction a model capturing ADAPRO’s logic. The model was
written in Promela[14]. Using the model checker Spin [4, 14], we
verified that this model satisfies the Theory of ADAPRO. Section
5 discusses the findings.
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loop
[w in workers]
RUN
workers:
start_sync()
ref
Startup
start_async()
loop
[w in workers]
wait()
:Supervisor:Session
Figure 4: Command propagation
4.1 Preconditions
The ADAPRO framework relies on a programming contract be-
tween the framework developers and the application developers.
There are necessary preconditions/assumptions on the environment
and user-defined code, that ADAPRO has to take as granted. The
full list of preconditions is given below for completeness:
(1) There will be no sabotage or force majeur incidents of any
kind whatsoever.
(2) The C++ compiler, standard library and runtime system, the
operating system and the hardware platform function cor-
rectly with respect to their specifications.
(3) The operating system scheduler satisfies weak fairness, i.e.
the property that every native thread that is eventually al-
ways executable, will be run on a processor unboundedly
many times.
(4) Allocatingmemory for new objects always succeeds, i.e. the
machine will not run out of (virtual) memory.
(5) User-defined code always terminates.
(6) Unless explicitly permitted to do so, by ADAPRO manual or
the API documentation, user-defined code will not modify
or delete any object owned by the framework.
(7) User-defined code never
• calls std::abort;
• raises a signal that can’t be handled;
• causes deadlocks or livelocks;
• uses Thread trigger methods inappropriately; or
• triggers a known issue in the framework.
(8) User-defined code conforms to thewell-known Resource Aqcui-
sition is Initialization (RAII) principle, so that all memory
and resources acquired by user-defined code will be auto-
matically released when ownership expires (e.g. a destruc-
tor of a user-defined object, holding a resource, is invoked).
(9) In DIM server mode or daemonmode, the user-defined code
does not directly interact with DIM or Systemd libraries re-
spectively.
The appropriateness of the use of trigger methods is best ex-
plained by enumerating the acceptable scenarios. We do this in Sec-
tions 4.3 and 6 for the design-level and the implementation-level
models respectively.
4.2 The Theory of ADAPRO
Let us first define the following notation:
(i) Denote Supervisor as s ;
(ii) The set of all Threads, including Supervisor, as T ;
(iii) The set of Workers, i.e. T \ {s} as V ;
(iv) null(x) as the predicate “Thread x doesn’t exist”;
(v) For each stateq the predicateq(x) expressing that “Thread x is
in state q” (e.g. ready(x) denotes “Thread x is in state READY”);
(vi) halting(x) as stopping(x) ∨ aborting(x);
(vii) halted(x) as stopped(x) ∨ aborted(x);
(viii) executable(x) as “Thread x is in the state RUNNING with its
command set to CONTINUE”; and
(ix) executing(x) as “Thread x is carrying out its action associated
with the state RUNNING”.
The following are the key correctness properties of ADAPRO,
that represent the postconditions promised as a part of the program-
ming contract:
(1) ∀t ∈T [null(t)U(ready(t)W starting(t))];
(2) ∀t ∈T[starting(t) →
(starting(t)U(running(t) ∨ paused(t) ∨ halting(t)))];
(3) ∀t ∈T[running(t) →
(running(t)W(paused(t) ∨ halting(t)))];
(4) ∀t ∈T[paused(t) →
(paused(t)W(running(t) ∨ stopping(t)))];
(5) ∀t ∈T[stopping(t) →
(stopping(t)U(stopped(t) ∨ aborting(t)))];
(6) ∀t ∈T[stopped(t) →  stopped(t))];
(7) ∀t ∈T[aborting(t) → (aborting(t)U aborted(t))];
(8) (∀t ∈T [aborted(t) →  aborted(t))]);
(9) (ready(s) → ∀v ∈V [null(v)]);
(10) (halted(s) → ∀v ∈V [null(v)]);
(11) (∃v ∈V [ready(v)] → starting(s));
(12) (∀v ∈V [stopped(v)] → (paused(s) ∨ stopped(s)));
(13) (∃v ∈V [aborted(v)] → (paused(s) ∨ stopped(s)));
(14) (halting(s) → ♦∀v ∈V [halted(v)]);
(15) ¬♦ aborted(s);
(16) ∀t ∈T [♦ executable(t) → ♦ executing(t)]; and
(17) ∀t ∈T [♦(executable(t) → executing(t))]W halting(s).
Formulae 1 – 8 capture the next-state relation induced by the FSM
(see Figure 1). Notice that some of them (1, 2, 5, 7), use strong un-
til (U), to express that the corresponding transitions are inevitable.
Others use weak until to express that the transitions are not re-
quired to be taken.
Formulae 9 – 15 express additional safety properties that every
ADAPRO session is expected to satisfy, e.g. 9 and 10 state that no
worker should exist while the Supervisor is still in the READY state,
or after it halts, whereas 15 says that the Supervisor should never
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abort. Formula 16 expresses weak fairness. Finally, formula 17 is a
liveness property that asserts that under the right conditions, all
Threads get to execute their main task.
4.3 Modeling Strategy
Since a model checker cannot verify a generic system with un-
bounded number of Thread instances, we model a system repre-
senting anADAPROapplicationwith one Supervisor and twowork-
ers. The rationale for using twoworkers is that it allows the distinc-
tion between universally and existentially quantified statements
about workers. Having two workers also allows the model checker
to expose potentially inconsistent worker state combinations. We
suspect that having three or more workers would only make the
model larger without introducing essentially new species of errors.
As noted in the beginning of Section 5, state space size was a prac-
tical reason forcing us to limit our scope to two workers.
The workers are treated as black boxes that only have their
FSM interface and do not communicate with each other or share
resources. A worker may initiate the following state transitions,
simulating unhandled exceptions and the use of the worker’s own
trigger methods6:
• During prepare, the worker chooses non-deterministically
between pausing, stopping, aborting, and doing nothing.
• During execute, the worker chooses non-deterministically
between stopping, aborting, and doing nothing.
• During finish, the worker chooses non-deterministically
between aborting and doing nothing.
Supervisor was modeled quite faithfully with respect to its C++
implementation. In the model, Supervisor doesn’t spontaneously
send commands to workers. It delegates commands received from
the init process, which represents the environment, and reacts if
both workers stop or at least one of them aborts.
4.4 Building the PromelaModel
Since ADAPRO initially did not have a formal design, we recon-
structed manually its design/logic from its C++ implementation in
the modeling language Promela[14]. We focused on the logic that
implements the FSM in Figure 1.
To model the behavior of a C++ program inevitably involves
figuring out how to map C++ programming patterns to Promela.
For example, the state of an ADAPRO Thread is stored in a private
field7 of type std::atomic<State>, where the template argument
is an enumerated type consisting of the eight different states indi-
cated in Figure 1. This field is only accessed through the accessors
get_state and set_state.
In a concurrent C++ application, naïve reading and writing of
shared memory does not work as one might expect. Threads exe-
cuting on CPU cores may use the cores’ local cache memory. It’s
not possible to control caching directly using C++ language con-
structs.Modificationsmade by one thread might get stuck in the lo-
cal cache of a CPU core and never become visible to other threads.
6 in C++, a Thread must always call its own trigger methods asynchronously; other-
wise it will end up in a deadlock waiting for itself to finnish executing its own com-
mand. This issue was known and documented well before beginning the verification
project.
7or data member in C++ terminology
Instruction reordering might also wreak havoc by causing mod-
ifications to show in wrong order. Instead of providing its own
solutions, ADAPRO relies on C++ standard library synchroniza-
tion primitives. In particular, reading and writing a shared state
involves a memory barrier to ensure that the changes will be visi-
ble to all parties as intended:
enum State { READY , STARTING , RUNNING , PAUSED ,
STOPPING , STOPPED , ABORTING , ABORTED };
enum Command { START , STOP , PAUSE , CONTINUE , ABORT };
c l as s Thread {
std ::atomic <State > state;
std ::atomic <Command > command ;
std ::mutex m;
void set_state ( const State s) noexcept {
state.store(s, std :: memory_order_release); }
public :
State get_state () const noexcept {
return state.load(std :: memory_order_consume); } };
In contrast, Promela offers high level atomicity: a single as-
signment is always atomic, and it is possible to declare a block of
statements to be atomic. Promela also guarantees sequential con-
sistency, defined by Leslie Lamport[20] as follows:
“[T]he result of any execution is the same as if the op-
erations of all the processors were executed in some
sequential order, and the operations of each individ-
ual processor appear in this sequence in the order
specified by its program.”
This implies that all (atomic) changes to variables are guaran-
teed to be visible to all processes. With these properties, inter-
thread communications in ADAPRObecome easy tomodel in Promela,
hence allowing us to focus onmodeling its algorithms. TheADAPRO
functionality mentioned can be modeled succinctly as as shown
below. We assume there are N threads; their states are stored in a
global array called states:
mtype = {READY ,STARTING ,RUNNING ,PAUSED ,STOPPING ,STOPPED ,
ABORTING ,ABORTED };
mtype states[N]; /*the states of the N threads */
#define get_state (i) states[i]
#define set_state (i,s) states[i] = s
In C++, std::mutex and std::condition_variable are often
used to implement inter-thread communication. In Promela we
can abstract this away. For example, if a process P wants to wait
until a certain predicate C becomes true, we can simply write C
as a guarding expression, hence resulting in a cleaner model. The
code example below presents a simplified Thread model that uti-
lizes the comparisons of the command and state values as guards
(e.g. get_command(k) == START):
proctype Thread (byte k) { /* a Thread with id k */
/* Startup : */
get_command (k) == START;
set_state (k,STARTING );
set_command (k,CONTINUE );
prepare (k); /* the action of the state STARTING */
/* Execution of user code: */
do
:: get_command (k) == CONTINUE ->
i f
:: get_state (k)== STARTING -> set_state (k,RUNNING )
:: get_state (k)== PAUSED -> set_state (k,RUNNING )
:: e l s e -> skip
f i
execute (k)
:: get_command (k) == PAUSE ->
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i f
:: get_state (k)== PAUSED -> get_command (k)!= PAUSED
:: e l s e ->
i f
:: get_state (k)== STARTING || get_state (k)== RUNNING
-> set_state (k,PAUSED)
:: e l s e -> skip
f i
f i
:: get_command (k)== STOP|| get_command (k)== ABORT -> break
od
/* Shutdown : */
i f
:: get_command (k)== STOP -> /* ... */
:: get_command (k)== ABORT -> /* ... */
f i }
Notice that in the case where the command is either STOP or
ABORT, get_command(i) appears twice. Because it’s a macro ex-
panding to commands[i], it doesn’t require a new variable. Both
comparisons are part of the same atomic Promela transaction. Us-
ing a temporary variable in a situation like this might increase the
state space size of themodel and even break temporal properties as
the level of atomicitywould change. During its execution, a Thread
will keep looping indefinitely and performing the appropriate ac-
tion as long as its command is not STOP or ABORT. If the command
changes to one of these, the Thread exits the loop and begins its
shutdown sequence.
The full model is nearly 800 lines long (including comments)
and can be found at8. The model maintains a quite fine grained
atomicity in order to maximise interleaving possibilities that will
be checked. As the tradeoff, model checking a fine grained model
can be expected to consume more resources.
5 VERIFICATION RESULTS WITH SPIN
Verifying the theory of ADAPRO successfully with a Supervisor
and two workers Spin takes less than three gigabytes of mem-
ory (without need for compressing states), and a couple of min-
utes with a high-end laptop. For three workers, the verification
takes Spin ran out of the 17 GB of memory available to it, after
nearly two hours. The verifier did manage to verify properties (1)
– (15) for threeworkers though, thanks to state compression option
-DCOLLAPSE used for compilation.
Writing the model itself exposed a number of design flaws and
bugs in the C++ code. Additional defects were found during model
checking because thePromelamodelwas accurate enough to repli-
cate them. This section discusses two of the issues that had man-
aged to remain undetected during testing.
5.1 Revoked ABORT Defect
Asmentioned in Section 3, a Thread has tomove to the state ABORTING
if it encounters an unhandled exception. It is important that the
ABORT command cannot be revoked. This requirement is captured
by specification (7) in the ADAPRO Theory (Section 4.2). It turned
out that this property was violated.
After startup, a Thread runs one loop as shown in the previous
listing. In C++, the algorithm looks like the following:
void Thread ::run () noexcept {
t ry {
/* Startup */
8https://gitlab.com/jllang/adapro/tree/5.0.0-RC3/models/promela
bool shutdown { f a l s e };
while (! shutdown ) {
switch (get_command ()) {
case CONTINUE : /* ... */ break ;
case PAUSE: /* ... */ break ;
defaul t : shutdown = true;
}
}
/* Shutdown */
}
catch ( const std :: ios_base ::failure & e) {HANDLE(e);}
catch ( const std :: system_error & e) {HANDLE (e);}
/* ... */
catch ( const std :: exception & e) {HANDLE(e);} }
The macro HANDLE takes care of printing an error message and
initiating the transition to state ABORTED via ABORT. Multiple catch
blockswith the same code are needed to avoid object slicing, which
would cause the method std::exception::what to return just
"std::exception" (on Linux systems at least), which is not a very
helpful error message.
It is possible that user-defined code throws an exception, which
is caught by one of the catch blocks. Themethodhandle_exception
then sets the command to ABORT. At this point, it may happen that
a PAUSE command arrives from an external source, and that Su-
pervisor propagates the command PAUSE to all workers. Now the
worker that was about to abort is told to go to the state PAUSED
instead. This violates the FSM constraints (see Fig. 1), as STOP and
ABORT should never get overridden by commands of lower priority.
To make sure that set_state can never violate the FSM mecha-
nism, and that the ABORT command is irrevokable, it was necessary
to redefine set_command (which was previously defined in a fash-
ion similar to set_state) in Promela as follows:
#define set_command (i, c) \
atomic { \
i f \
:: c == START && commands [i] == CONTINUE -> \
commands [i] = START \
/* ... */ \
:: c == STOP && (commands [i] == CONTINUE || \
commands [i] == PAUSE) -> \
commands [i] = STOP \
:: c == ABORT -> commands [i] = ABORT \
f i }
The corresponding update in the C++ code required changing
the locking scheme. It took a few attempts to arrive at a correct so-
lution. TheDivinemodel checker was found useful during this de-
velopment process, as it discovered a flaw in one of the attempted
solutions. The final correct version is given below:
void Thread :: set_command ( const Command c) noexcept {
bool success { f a l s e };
std ::lock_guard <std ::mutex > lock{m};
switch (c) {
case START:
success = get_state () == READY
&& get_command () == CONTINUE ;
break;
case PAUSE:
success = state_in (STARTING | RUNNING )
&& get_command () == CONTINUE ;
break;
/* ... */
case ABORT:
success =state_in (STARTING |RUNNING |STOPPING );
}
i f (success ) {
command .store(c, std :: memory_order_release);
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} }
The method run had to be changed as well, to hold a lock on the
mutex when performing state transitions. The lock has to be re-
leased before, and reacquired after, executing user-defined virtual
methods, though. The reason is that the user-defined virtual meth-
ods are allowed to use certain trigger methods of the executing
Thread (see Section 4.3).
5.2 A Synchronisation Defect
Spin was also to able to re-discover a known issue. There was
an overlooked design flaw in the C++ code for a synchronisation
method named wait_for_state, part of the API. It had escaped
CPPUnit tests of ADAPRO that existed at the time, which had
around 90% overall line coverage.
The method wait_for_state is supposed to block until the
Thread has moved to a state greater than or equal to a given target
state. In terms of executions, some states come after others, so they
are greater than their predecessors. As ADAPRO leaves scheduling
to the operating system, it cannot guarantee that get_state will
be executed exactly at the right moment, and not after the Thread
has already moved to a later state, hence the need for also accept-
ing states greater than the target state.
Two synchronization primitives have to be added to the Thread
class in order to implement blocking behaviour. The C++ code snip-
pet below shows the erroneous wait_for_state implementation.
It relies on the integer representation underlying the enumerated
type State for the comparison get_state() < s:
c l as s Thread {
std ::atomic <State > state;
std :: mutex m;
std :: condition_variable cv;
void set_state ( const State s) noexcept {
state.store(s, std :: memory_order_release);
cv.notify_all (); // This new line was needed
}
public :
State get_state () const noexcept; // Same as before
void wait_for_state ( const State s) noexcept {
i f (get_state () < s) {
std :: unique_lock <std ::mutex > lock{m};
cv.wait(lock ,
[ thi s ,s] () { return get_state () < s;}
);
} }
};
In the code fragment above, the lambda expression given to the
standard library method wait uses the method get_state to com-
pare the state of the Thread instance to s. It’s a guard against spuri-
ous wake-ups. wait will always block until the condition variable
is notified and the lambda expression returns true. The behavior
can be succinctly modeled in Promela, as shown below9:
#define LT(x, y) x > y /* Sic */
i n l ine wait_for_state (i, s) { !(LT(get_state (i), s)) }
Informally, the state ordering meant in wait_for_state is the
preorder of states implied by Figure 1 when reading the arrows
9 The peculiar definition for LT, the less-than relation, can be explained with the fact
that Spin treats the symbolic names in mtype declarations in big-endian order, i.e.
increasing from right to left. Note that there are no spurious wake-ups in Promela.
as “less than”. Formally, the ordering is imposed by the enum defi-
nition for State. In most situations these definitions are similar
enough to not cause appreciable difference in behaviour. There
is a special case, however: when a Thread in state PAUSED is ex-
pected to proceed to the state RUNNING. Since PAUSED is formally
greater than RUNNING, an invocation wait_for_state(RUNNING)
on a paused Thread will immediately unblock, which is incorrect!
This error was quickly found during the model checking with Spin.
C++ allows the programmer to specify integral constants for
enumerators. This enables the use of bitmasks for conveniently ex-
pressing the exact set of target states where the waiting method
needs to unblock. This detail was not modeled in Promela. Doing
so would have required changing mtype for byte and losing sym-
bolic names for states and commands in debug messages. Below is
the reviewed C++ definition that enables the use of bit masks:
enum State {
READY = 1,
STARTING = 2,
/* ... */
ABORTED = 128 };
#define state_in (mask) (get_state () & mask) > 0
The waiting function wait_for_state_mask utilizes bitmasks.
It is the correct way to wait for a Thread to enter one of the states
in the given bitmask. Below is the implementation:
void Thread :: wait_for_state _mask( const uint8_t mask)
noexcept {
i f (!state_in (mask)) {
std :: unique_lock <std ::mutex > lock{m};
cv.wait(lock ,
[ thi s ,s] () { return state_in (mask);}
); }
}
This method can wait for a Thread in state PAUSED to continue:
wait_for_state _mask( RUNNING | STOPPING | STOPPED |
ABORTING | ABORTED );
As mentioned, the Promela definition for states was not changed,
so instead of taking a bitmask, a hard-coded inline waiting block
was added for each of the the five bitmasks that were needed. For
instance, the C++ method invocation above was hard-coded into
Promela as follows:
i n l ine wait_for_RESUME_mask(i) {
get_state (i) == RUNNING || get_state (i) == STOPPING ||
get_state (i) == STOPPED || get_state (i) == ABORTING ||
get_state (i) == ABORTED ; }
6 DIVINE MODELS AND RESULTS
The interplay of state and command setters, state transitions, and
waiting methods is non-trivial. Not all of the subtleties involved
were exposed by the Promelamodel, partly because of the seman-
tical difference between the Promela and C++ languages, but also
because some of the details were left out from the model. This pro-
vided motivation for implementation-level model checking.
We created the class DummyWorker for modeling workers in Di-
vine. It inherits the appropriate ADAPRO class and behaves like
thePromelaworkermodel. Themethod prepare letsDivine choose
an integer from [0..3]non-deterministically, expressed as __vm_choose(4)
for selecting between the asynchronous triggermethodspause_async
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and stop_async, throwing an exception, and doing nothing. Simi-
larly, the methods execute and finish use the non-deterministic
choice feature for implementing the behaviour described in Sec-
tion 4.3. The following C++ code example illustrates the implemen-
tation:
c l as s Dummy Worker f ina l : public Worker {
protec ted:
v i r tua l void prepare () {
switch (__vm_choose (4)) {
case 0: pause_async (); break;
case 1: stop_async (); break;
case 2: throw std ::runtime_error {"Error"};
defaul t : break;
}
}
v i r tua l void execute () { /* Stop , throw , or skip */ }
v i r tua l void finish () { /* Throw or skip */ }
}
We created three models for Divine using this class; the small
modelwith one DummyWorker, themediummodelwith Supervisor
and one DummyWorker, and the largemodel that runs a full ADAPRO
Session, with its built-in Supervisor and two DummyWorker instances,
using a hard-coded configuration. All models also have a main
thread, that creates the appropriate ADAPRO objects, waits until
they have carried out their tasks, and exits the program.
6.1 Premature Destructor Call Defect
As mentioned above, the smallest Divine model featured just the
main thread and one worker Thread. In the model, the main thread
starts theworker and calls wait_for_state_mask(STOPPED | ABORTED).
Divine found an execution where the main thread was woken up
when the worker was performing an earlier state transition. Before
the main thread could proceed to check whether or not the worker
had reached the desired state, a context switch was performed, let-
ting the worker to proceed. Next, the worker would set its state
to STOPPED, but before it was fully stopped, the main thread was
scheduled again for execution. At that point, the main thread ob-
served that the worker had entered into the STOPPED state and pro-
ceeded to exit the program.
At this point, a known issue about destroying a Thread with its
backend implementation still running was triggered. The worker’s
destructor was called as a part of the automatic cleanup following
the RAII principle. When the backend thread of the worker was
scheduled again for execution, it tried to refer to the ADAPRO
Thread object that didn’t exist anymore which then caused the
program to exit abnormally (and seemed to crash DiOS as well,
through its Pthreads implementation). The premature destructor
call issue has been the cause of the most catastrophical and hard
to debug problems in the entire ADAPRO framework.
With the current design of ADAPRO Threads, this issue is not
easy to fix. However, there exists a workaround which was found
to be correct in all situations by Divine. This workaround is to
simply make the virtual destructor of the final inheriting class to
call Thread::join (which then calls std::thread::join to join
the background thread) before releasing any resources.
6.2 Non-Terminated String Defect
A classic low-level programming mistake was found with Divine
when verifying the unit tests for Thread. The abort method of a
Thread was designed to permit the user to trigger the state transi-
tion through ABORTING to ABORTED with an error message given as
an std::string instance. The method dynamically allocated a C-
style string, i.e. an array ofASCII characters, and called std::strcpy
using the pointer and length provided by the std::string instance.
The length reported was one less than needed for the character
array, because a C-style string must end with an additional non-
printable null character. The resulting C-style string would contain
all the same characters as the std::string object, but wouldn’t be
null-terminated.
Depending on the contents of the heap memory, reading a non-
terminated string might succeed without problems, produce some
extra garbage data past the intended ending of the string, or even
cause a segmentation violation. There was also a lesser problem,
namely that in some situations the C-style stringwas never deleted,
causing a memory leak. Even Valgrind was not able to detect this
leak, because it never actualised during debugging.
Both the off-by-one errorwith the string length and thememory
leak were quickly detected by Divine, thanks to its sophisticated
mechanisms that keep track on the objects allocated from heap
and the pointers referring to them. Unit tests couldn’t reliably de-
tect this problem, as the next byte in heap usually happened to be
zero. Even though this problem would have been easy to fix, the
authors decided to abandon the abortmethod altogether as an un-
necessary complication to the overall design.
This defect had been present in the framework for a very long
time and wasn’t even detected during the hundreds of hours of sim-
ulations performed with ADAPOS applications[22], built on top of
ADAPRO, under maximum load, because the applications never
encountered unhandled exceptions during the simulations.
6.3 Premature Command Defect
A model checker can only find errors reachable from the model
under verification. A known issue with starting a Thread asyn-
chronously, and then sending it a command before it has carried
out its startup sequence, resulting in the command being ignored,
was not detected by Divine. The reason is that the models used
the framework the way it was intended to be used, never exposing
this particular scenario.
7 EXPERIENCES
In this section, we discuss the experiences we had with the tools,
techniques, and languages used in this project.
7.1 Mapping C++ to Promela
The strength of Promela is its language level atomicity and syn-
chronization concepts. This allows synchronization patterns to be
expressedmore concisely than in C++. The difference in the amount
of code can be observed in the code examples above.
There are also programming patterns that cannot be nicely trans-
lated from C++ to Promela. For example, in C++ Thread is a class.
The state of a Thread is represented as a (private) field (i.e. member
in C++ parlance) within the class, which can be safely and conve-
niently accessed in other contexts through accessors. This sort of
encapsulation is not possible in Promela, and Threads need to be
modeled using other means.
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We modeled Threads with processes and global arrays. In gen-
eral, the field f is represented by an array af , with af [i] storing
the value of f of the ith Thread. Such encoding clutters the model
and moreover makes the model itself more error prone.
Not having methods, classes, or inheritance at disposal with
Promela added extra challenges, because these programming lan-
guage features had to be substitutedwith CPPmacros and Promela
inline blocks. This complicated debugging themodel in this project.
While the resulting model in this project is still of manageable size,
for a larger project this mismatch may eventually lead to a main-
tainability problem with hand-written models.
The eight states and five commands of a Thread were modeled
with mtype declarations in Promela. As mtype declarations share
the same domain (of one byte in size), having two of them opened
the possibility of erroneously assigning a state value to a command
variable and vice versa. This risk had to be taken, since represent-
ing the two enumerated types with two distinct byte values might
have grown the state space of the model. As mentioned, bytes can-
not be pretty-printed whichmakes debugging less convenient than
with mtypes. On the other hand, bytes can be bitmasked, which is
convenient as we have seen. Bitmasks of states and commands are
utilized in the C++ implementation of the framework.
7.2 Verifying C++ With Divine
This project initially used an older version of Divine 4, but had
to change to the statically linked binary version 4.1.20+2018.12.17
because of a bug in the DiOS operating system of an older Divine
version. The properties verified with Divine included the absence
of deadlocks, crashes, memory acces violations, and memory leaks.
Divine 4 is composed of a specialized version of the LLVMClang
compiler, a Phtreads implementation, a C++ standard library im-
plementation, a minimalistic operating system, DiOS, the DiVM
virtual machine and a model checker [3, 24]. The Divine model
checker only observes the state transitions of DiVM. This design
allows the Divine model checker to also find errors in the oper-
ating system and libraries, in addition to verifying the application
proper. A handful of defects in these software layers were found
and reported to the Divine developers during this project.
As it turns out, model checking a non-trivial application with
Divine might not be as simple as just compiling and verifying the
model, even if Divine accepts C++ as an input language. It was
found that C++ source code files must be compiled in a single in-
vocation of the divine cc command. Libraries, other than the
standard library or Pthreads can’t be used, unless included in the
same build with the user program.
The C++ codebase of ADAPRO had to be modified with macros,
undocumented internal Divine compiler attributes (for optimisa-
tion) and DiVM hypercalls for getting it to work with Divine. In
general, the extent ofmodifications required probably depends heav-
ily on the code under verification. We needed to put effort into the
conversion, largely because some parts of the Linux and POSIX
APIs were missing from the Divine library layer. Thus, these parts
of the code needed to be guarded by macros. The missing func-
tionality included access to system clock, setting the nice value
of the running process, and setting scheduling options such as
thread affinities. We also had to disable many non-critical parts
of the code, e.g. logging, a watchdog mechanism, and change most
of constans into functions, to keep the state space size feasible.
7.3 State Space Explosion
The hardest challenge in this project was the notorious state space
explosion problem. As discussed in the beginning of Section 5, we
could only fully verify the Promela model with two workers.
For making verification with Divine possible, the implementa-
tion of ADAPRO needed several iterations of refactoring and op-
timisation to keep the state space size of even the small model man-
ageable. One particular header file (headers/data/Parameters.hpp)
had many global constant variables. In C++ global variables have
internal linkage, which means that every translation unit gets their
own unique copies of these variables, stored in different memory
locations in the computer executing the compiled machine code.
Among other optimizations, replacing these global variables with
functions returning literals on demand, provided around 60% re-
duction in the size of DiVM states during verification runs.
The number of states was another aspect of the problem. For
the small model, running divine check took around 5,000 DiVM
states. When the medium-size model was finally checked success-
fully, the verification took almost 500,000 states. By the time of
writing this paper, the large model and an example application in-
volving disk I/O through a virtual filesystem image still remain to
be checked.
Disabling the logger facility of ADAPRO and all other standard
output and error stream operations also proved to make a huge
difference in the size of the state space. Before disabling output
operations and watchdog mechanisms, a verification run for the
medium-size model on a virtual machine, in a cloud provided by
SURFsara, had been running for more than 17 hours of wall clock
time, consuming over 37 gigabytes, with no end in sight. After
the optimisations, the medium-size model can now be checked in
twenty minutes on a laptop, with the peak memory usage being in
the order of seven gigabytes. Even after all optimisations, a virtual
machine provided by SURFsara couldn’t finish the verification run
for the large model, given 124 GB of RAM dedicated to Divine.
7.4 Scalability
When formulating the Theory of ADAPRO, we found out that Spin
was not able to digest the properties (1) – (8) in a single formula.
We first tried to do this and Spin encountered a buffer overflow
when parsing the property. On second thought, having one huge
property would probably have been prohibitively expensive to ver-
ify anyway.
We found out, that even thoughDivine supportsmulti-threaded
verification, the performance doesn’t scale for an arbitrary number
of threads. Especially on the virtual machines provided by SURF-
sara, the scaling proved to be unsatisfactory. As mentioned before,
verifying the Promela model takes only a couple of minutes, so
multi-threaded verification with Spin was not needed.
It seems that, for the ADAPRO models, two verification threads
yield the best overall throughput in terms of DiVM states and in-
structions explored per second. The higher the number of threads,
the higher the ratio of system time to user time. Thus, beyond the
saturation point, increasing the number of threads seems to only
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increase the CPU time consumption and heat production. In fact,
verification speed seems to slowly decline as a function of thread
count. Divine developers were not aware of such performance is-
sues, so our models might have been anomalous, or perhaps the
virtual machine or the guest system was configured suboptimally.
7.5 Thoughts on the Learning Curves
All in all, the experiences with the Spin andDivinemodel checkers
have been positive and encouraging in this project. Even though
the Promela language was quite different from C++, it felt easy to
learn. Likewise, after some initial learning effort, using Divine to
check almost any standard C++ code proved to be easy. Even with
their own challenges, using both of the model checkers was easy
compared to tactic-based interactive theorem proving with HOL
on Poly/ML or the use of propositions-as-types interpretation of
intuitionistic type theory in Agda.
Of course, programmers need to get at least some degree of fa-
miliarity with the basics of enumerative model checking, in order
to understand how Spin and Divine are best exploited. We esti-
mate that it’d take a few weeks of training to acquaint developers
with a few years of experience in programming and some math-
ematical maturity, into the use of these model checkers. Perhaps
the effort could be compared with learning a new programming
language.
We found the output of Spin model checker harder to under-
stand than the reports generated by static analysis, testing, and
code coverage tools, or the Divine model checker. Furthermore,
the semantical gap between Promela and C++, especially in terms
of their memory models and atomicity, is considerable. This might
introduce inaccuracies to hand-made translations betweenC++ and
Promela. Luckily, this was not a problem since we also performed
model checking on the very C++ source code with Divine.
7.6 Impact on Workflow
Installing the Spin andDivinemodel checkerswas easy and straight-
forward. The Debian GNU/Linux operating system has Spin in-
cluded in its standard package repository, so the installation is just
a matter of running apt-get install spin. Using the precom-
piled binary version of Divine is just as easy. We considered it suf-
ficient for this project to run Divine by invoking a custom BASH
runner script.
Thanks to their simple command-line interfaces, integrating Spin
and Divine into the workflow of the software project was fast and
easy (after the initial work spent in learning the correct flags and
arguments). These tools don’t requiremaintaining complicated con-
figuration files, but their use can be fully parameterized and auto-
mated with regular shell or makefile scripts, for example. Setting
up the integration takesmaybe even less time thanwith an average
software tool.
After integrating the model checkers into the project workflow,
they can be used without hassle on daily basis, just like any other
analysis or testing tools. Model checking unit tests with Divine
was found especially useful, because that way, existing test cases
can be explored exhaustively. As noted above, sheer code coverage
is not enough to ensure exhaustiveness of tests. Developing models
and implementation in parallel seems to be an efficient analogue
of test-driven development.
8 CONCLUSION
The LTL properties listed in Section 4.2, should, from now on, be
considered an integral part of the specification of ADAPRO. Model
checking was found to be a valuable addition to software devel-
oper’s toolbox, with a good return of investment value (which al-
ready seems to be the consensus in the literature). It seems that
different model checkers can find different kinds of issues, on dif-
ferent levels of abstraction (e.g. design/implementation). Many of
the issues found during this project require rather specific circum-
stances to occur, making them nearly impossible to test, but when
they do occur, theymay trigger chain reactions of dire consequence.
We believe that easy integration to the everyday workflow is
important for any software tool to become successful in the in-
dustry. In terms of automation possibilities, it seems that we’re al-
ready getting there with model checkers. However, APIs, output
formatting, and documentation still may to need extra polishing,
not to mention IDE support. We believe that these points need to
be addressed, before formal methods can attract the attention of
mainstream programmers.
The benefits of model checking far outweigh the slightly rough
edges of themodel checkers. The shortcomings could bemitigated,
with more resources invested in the development of formal verifi-
cation tools. The sheer number of rather simple defects that were
found in supposedly stable code, only after deploying model check-
ers, raises a question: Can software, that has not been formally ver-
ified, be trusted? We doubt it.
8.1 Future Prospects
The effect on fairness imposed by user Threads getting exclusive
access to CPU cores through the use of the Pthreads API, has not
been explored. As mentioned before, configuration access and In-
teraction with external systems using signals, the DIM protocol,
and the Linux systemd API was not modeled. Investigating these
aspects might prove useful, albeit challenging.
Even though the Promelamodel was successfully verified with
twoworkers, there’s no hard mathematical argument showing that
two workers suffice. Decreasing the granularity of the Promela
model might allow more workers to be simulated. Using a swarm-
based approach[16] might turn out to be a useful bug-hunting tech-
nique with larger models for both Spin and Divine.
TheDivinemodels still deserve more attention. Firstly, measur-
ing the effects of different kinds of code optimizations on the num-
ber and size of Divine states would be an interesting topic for a
quantitative study. Secondly, usingmonitors to performLTLmodel
checking on ADAPRO was not yet attempted, because our Divine
modelswere too large even without LTL properties. Thirdly, verify-
ing ADAPRO under aweak memorymodel was also not attempted,
since Divine does not yet support such a feature.
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